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смысл творчества как поиск смысла человеческой судьбы, места человека в мире, 
его обязанностей по отношению к другому человеку, к обществу, вселенной, исто-
рии. По его мнению, человек назначен не столько к спасению, сколько к творчеству, 
а проблема спасения может быть — как еретически бы это и звучало — решена 
только как проблема призвания человека к творчеству. Каждый творческий акт — 
это акт эсхатологический и метаисторический, который побеждает власть этого 
павшего мира. Воздействие иного духовного, ноуменального порядка, приближает 
реальный «конец» мира вещей. Творчество охватывает все сферы человеческой де-
ятельности, не только сферу культуры и эстетики, но и сферу науки, философии, 
техники, отношений человека к другому человеку, природе и вселенной. По мне-
нию Н. А. Бердяева, творчество это истинное оправдание и назначение человека, 
оно не требует оправдания — это оно оправдывает человека. 
Творчество и свобода неразрывны и они свидетельствуют об эсхатологическом 
назначении человека. Как сказала Е. Герцик в своих Воспоминаниях, для Н. А. Бер-
дяева существует только один императив, один Божественный наказ: «Твори, то не 
погибнешь. Антропология и творчество у Бердяева — синонимы»68.
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CULTURAL DETERMINANTS OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE: 
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Идеи культурного влияния на научные понятия, теории и научные разработки были пред-
ставлены в философии с самого начала, хотя большую часть времени они были на пери-
ферии основных философских течений. Эта ситуация изменилась в современную эпоху. 
Вопрос о роли культуры в процессе человеческого познания мы можем найти в работе 
Фрэнсиса Бэкона (в его теории «идолы») и в критической философии Канта. В моей статье 
я представляю две версии идеи культурных детерминант научных знаний, сформулиро-
ванных в польской философии науки. Первая была создана Людвиком Флеком — врачом 
и биологом, который опубликовал свою знаменитую книгу «Генезис и развитие научного 
факта» в 1935 году. Вторая была предложена химиком и философом Стефаном Амстер-
дамским в книге «Между Историей и Методом», опубликованной в 1983 году.
In my article I want to sketch two versions of the idea of cultural determinants of sci-
entifi c knowledge. The plan of the presentation reads as follows: fi rstly I will outline the 
idea of cultural infl uence on scientifi c theories in general; next, I will characterize views 
of two Polish philosophers — Ludwik Fleck and Stefan Amsterdamski, and fi nally in the 
conclusion I will present some summing up remarks.
I
The idea of cultural infl uence on science — namely on scientifi c concepts, theories 
and scientifi c development — has been present in philosophy from the beginning although 
 
68 См. Аванесова Г. А.,  Вахренева П. А. Духовный проект Н. Бердяева (Опыт системного подхо-
да к наследию). Онлине: http://www.philos.msu.ru/vestnik/philos/art/2005/avanes_vahreneva.htm
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for most of the time it has been on the margins of the main philosophical currents. In 
philosophy, and especially epistemology, the idea of the autonomous and rational cogni-
tive subject was predominant. From this perspective the concept of non-cognitive factors 
infl uencing cognition process was treated in terms of epistemological obstacles. 
In ancient philosophy the idea of cultural infl uence on cognition was fi rst formulated 
in a positive form by Xenophanes, a Greek philosopher, theologian and a poet; and next 
by sophists, namely Protagoras and Gorgias. In their views we can see main consequences 
of this idea, especially anti-realism and relativism. And that relativism was the cause of 
Socratic and Platonian attacks on sophists and also was the source of the attempts to create 
some absolute standpoints in epistemology.
The question of the role of culture in human cognition arose again at the beginning 
of the modern era. In the works of Francis Bacon we can fi nd very sophisticated analysis 
of some disturbances of our knowledge. These are called «idols» and are connected with 
some aspects of our cognitive condition: biological, individual, linguistic and cultural. 
They hardly infl uence our cognitive process and our knowledge of the external world. 
The role of philosophers is to create some methodology to help to avoid them. Bacon 
believed that his philosophy of science, especially his theory of induction, would deliver 
us from idols and fi nally we would possess true and objective knowledge. In fact, the main 
modern philosophers from Descartes to Husserl tried to fi nd the ultimate foundations of 
that knowledge. 
One of the crucial points for the idea of cultural infl uence on scientifi c knowledge 
was the critical philosophy of Immanuel Kant. As we know, Kant formulated a thesis that 
our cognition isn’t a passive registration stimuli from the external world but some active 
process in which, using our cognitive structures, we construct our world as the object of 
knowledge. Kant himself was not interested in examining the sources of these cognitive 
structures. He took his epistemological project as transcendental so he rejected all natural-
istic problems such as the question of the genesis of these structure. But with time, there 
were many attempts to naturalize the transcendental philosophy formed, for example, by 
Jakob Friedrich Fries and Friedrich Lange. The most widely spread conception was the 
idea of evolutionary genesis of cognitive structures leading to some kind of «biologiza-
tion» of Kantian epistemology (for example Konrad Lorenz, David Campbell and Gerhard 
Vollmer). That process of naturalization of transcendentalism lead in turn to treating hu-
man cognitive structures as rooted in culture or language. It opened the way to the notion 
that our cognition is less or more determined by cultural factors. 
However, in the fi rst half of the 20th century that idea was present only on the margins 
of the philosophy of science. The main current of that philosophy was dominated by logi-
cal positivism and analytical philosophy interested mainly in the context of justifi cation, 
not the context of discovery. This position characterizes both neo-positivism of Rudolf 
Carnap and critical rationalism of Karl R. Popper. Only after the Second World War, with 
Willard Van Orman Quine, Thomas S. Kuhn, Robert Hanson, Michel Foucault, Stephen 
Toulmin, Paul K. Feyerabend, the idea of the important role of culture for development 
of science received a broader recognition. Now, at the beginning of the 21st century, that 
concept is so strong and omnipresent — especially in a sociological version — that one 
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can feel the shift of importance going to the other side and the research on the context of 
discovery often leads to ignoring the context of justifi cation and its important role.
II
Polish philosophy of science in the 20th century had rather neo-positivistic and ana-
lytical form — like the Lvov-Warsaw School. However, there were some thinkers who 
broke this paradigm. I will try to present two of non-positivist Polish philosophers of sci-
ence whose names are widely known in the world of philosophy. The fi rst one is Ludwik 
Fleck. Fleck was a medical doctor and a biologist who was interested in some question of 
methodology and philosophy of science. In 1935 he published a book called The Genesis 
and Development of a Scientifi c Fact in which he presented his conception of evolution 
of scientifi c theories in connection of broad cultural and symbolic sphere. The book was 
ignored in Polish philosophical milieu interested rather in logical structure of science than 
its sociological and cultural background; one should notice that Fleck’s ideas wasn’t origi-
nal and but was rather very similar to the views of such thinkers as Durkheim, Levy-Bruhl 
and French philosophers of science of fi rst decades of XXth century. Let us try to look at 
the ideas presented in this book. 
The starting point for Fleck’s analysis is the thesis on the necessary theoretical back-
ground of scientifi c experience. This thesis held by, for example, Pierre Duhem and Henri 
Poincarй, says that in scientifi c cognition there are no pure facts because every scientifi c 
fact is possible only on the ground of some system of thought or conceptual scheme. 
Scientifi c facts are incomprehensible without some previous theories, concepts and rules 
which could enable their interpretation and intersubjective verifi cation. So Fleck says that 
a scientist doesn’t work in a theoretical vacuum and his mind is not a tabula rasa. A sci-
entist always works and conducts experiments in the framework of some system of ideas. 
Fleck called this system a «thought style». He defi ned a thought style as «directed percep-
tion, with corresponding mental and objective assimilation of what has been so perceived. 
It is characterized by common features in the problems of interest to a thought collective, 
by the judgement which the thought collective consider evident, and by the methods which 
it applies as means of cognition»1.
It is important not to treat a thought style as an obstacle or disturbance in a cognitive 
process. On the contrary, the thought style must be seen as similar to the Kantian a priori 
necessary condition of every possible knowledge. The thought style is that kind of con-
dition. Without the thought style — that is some conceptual scheme organizing experi-
ence — scientifi c practice would be impossible. But the thought style — in opposition 
to Kantian transcendental conditions — is not a priori structure but is created by some 
social or cultural group. This group of people connected by a shared thought style Fleck 
called a «thought collective». The thought style is therefore a feature of some collective 
consciousness similar to that postulated by Durkheim and close to concept of mentalitй 
introduced by Levy-Bruhl.
What is the function of a thought style? The thought style is some kind of a general 
convention or set of conventions and rules which makes scientifi c practice possible — this 
 
1 Ludwik Fleck, Genesis and Development of a Scientifi c Fact, Chicago 1979, p. 99.
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means theoretisation and experimentation. These conventions and rules form a demarca-
tion line between science and non-science (or pseudo-science), establish problems and 
questions, provide criteria for acceptance of hypothesis and establish methods of verifi ca-
tion or falsifi cation. 
For Fleck science isn’t a non-prejudiced description of objective reality, independent 
and external facts because we never have an access to pure facts and a reality independent 
of every/any interpretation. Science is rather a process of constructing some models or 
images of the world on the basis of some collective rules whose genesis is social or cul-
tural and whose nature is conventional. 
That view leads to at least three serious consequences. The fi rst one is anti-realism: 
the world described by science is not independent of cognitive subjects but is a creation of 
collective consciousness. Our scientifi c knowledge does not deal with the external world 
but only with a social or cultural construction. The second consequence is relativism: it is 
possible for many incommensurable thought styles or images of the world to exist and we 
do not have any independent and external criteria to choose. Traditional epistemic values 
like truth, rationality and objectivity are always «for someone», are always perspectival 
and contextual. The third consequence is instrumentalism: if our theories do not describe 
the real world we must treat them only as some tools which let us cope with the world and 
solve practical problems. 
III
It is widely known that Fleck’s ideas had a strong impact on Kuhn’s conception of 
paradigms and scientifi c revolutions. It is also known that Kuhn’s ideas led to many prob-
lematic consequences as those presented above. There were many attempts to avoid those 
theoretical dangers undertaken by, for example, Imre Lakatos, Larry Laudan, Ian Hacking 
etc. One of those attempts is a concept proposed by a Polish chemist and a philosopher of 
science Stefan Amsterdamski. Amsterdamski developed his ideas in many books interact-
ing especially with Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend. The ultimate version of his philosophy 
of science can be found in Between History and Method published in 19832. 
Amsterdamski’s intention was to avoid two extremities: on the one hand, the extrem-
ity of ahistorical and pure logical philosophy of science proposed by neopositivism and 
Popper’s critical rationalism — both focused on the context of justifi cation — and on 
the other hand, the extremity of historical and social relativism implied by the ideas of 
Kuhn, Feyerabend and the strong programme in the sociology of knowledge — which fo-
cused only on the context of discovery. In opposition to Carnap and Popper, Amsterdamski 
claimed that philosophical analysis of science must take into account historical and cul-
tural dimension of scientifi c progress. Simultaneously, in opposition to Kuhn, Feyerabend 
and the strong programme he stated that this historical and cultural perspective on science 
does not necessary lead to cognitive relativism and destruction of epistemic values like 
truth, objectivity and rationality. 
The key concept in Amsterdamski’s analysis is «the ideal of science». At fi rst glance it 
seemed very similar to popular terms like «paradigm», «conceptual scheme», «episteme» 
 
2 Stefan Amsterdamski, Między historią a metodą, Warszawa 1983, especially p. 19-41.
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and Fleck’s «thought style» but it would be a mistake to confuse it with them. The ideal 
of science is something broader than a paradigm or a thought style. One ideal of scien-
ce can contain many paradigms and many thought styles. The ideal of science is a very 
general structure — or superstructure — that creates a common background for many 
types of scientifi c activities. In doing that it becomes a condition of commensurability 
and congruence between various thought styles or paradigms. Those paradigms may seem 
very different or even incongruent only in microscale when we confront one with another. 
However, in a wider perspective, in macroscale and some kind of historical long duration 
we can see them as various emanations of different realization of the same fundamental 
ideal of science. The best example is the modern ideal of science in which a scientifi c 
activity is conceived as a synthesis of mathematisation and experimentation. This ideal of 
science creates a common ground for so different paradigms like classical, relativistic and 
quantum mechanics or different thought styles in chemistry and biology. 
Amsterdamski indicates four main functions of the ideal of science: fi rstly, the ideal 
of science determines potential borders of a phenomenon called science, this means that it 
draws a demarcation line between science and non-science. Secondly, the ideal of science 
is a fi lter serving to separate interesting problems from non-interesting (scientifi c from 
non-scientifi c, rational from non-rational). Thirdly, the ideal of science outlines rules of 
acceptance of hypothesis, this means it determines methods of verifi cation. Fourthly, the 
ideal of science implies some scientifi c ethos, an internal organization of scientists and 
social forms of scientifi c activity.
IV
Let us briefl y summarize and appraise the two presented conceptions. It is not hard to 
see that the fi rst and chronologically earlier one has strong anti-realistic or idealistic and 
relativistic consequences. Therefore, Fleck’s ideas became very popular in last decades 
of XXth century especially in sociological oriented philosophy of science. The theory of 
thought styles and thought collectives is often interpreted in the perspective of constru-
ctivism, contextualism and social determinism of knowledge. Generally speaking, these 
views state that all scientifi c knowledge (or human knowledge in general) is created in 
particular social-cultural conditions and changing historical circumstances. For this re-
ason scientifi c world image is not a representation of external reality but only a human 
construction determined by historically relative and in some respects accidental interests 
of some culture, society or collective. In short, knowledge is merely expression or image 
of particular historical social structure and its internal relations. 
This view has clearly Marxian origins and achieved popularity in our times due to the 
strong programme in the sociology of knowledge and postmodern thought. Social sciences 
generally accepted this view as self-evident and it has widely spread in our culture as a 
kind of truth of postmodern intellectual faith. But in fact this view is neither self-evident 
nor simple. On the general and trivial level social constructivism says nothing original or 
controversial. It only claims that our knowledge is created under the of infl uence some 
non-cognitive factors and our scientifi c theories are, in some aspects relative with respect 
to time and place. These statements are of course true and at the same time obvious and no 
one wants to polemicize with them. 
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But on the radical and consequent level social constructivism generates many prob-
lems and diffi culties that demand deep and insightful philosophical refl ection which is 
unfortunately absent in postmodern social sciences. First of all this theory is self-refuting. 
If all knowledge is a construction determined by changing social interest, so also the 
statement about a construction being determined by social interests as a kind of kno-
wledge is a construction determined by changing social interests. This means that if 
social constructivism is true — it can be false (in other social conditions). Therefore, if we 
want to save that view from falsifi cation, we cannot make it general — but in that situation 
it loses any predicative value (as e.g. statement says that some people are good and some 
are bad). This point is crucial and some of social constructivists seem to understand it but 
they do not have any idea how to avoid that antinomy. There is also one more diffi culty 
with this view. If every scientifi c or cognitive concept is a construction determined by 
society or its interest or some social relations (of production, of power, of sex etc.), it leads 
to a conclusion that also these concepts («society», «interest» etc.) are constructions; and 
moreover that these social interests which determine our knowledge are also constructions. 
It poses one more question: how can some construction create some other constructions. 
This is of course another antinomic problem which social constructivists cannot solve. In 
fact they are constructivists but non-global and non-consequent because they are realists in 
reference to the society and its interests treating them as existing external and independent 
of their minds. In short, they are constructivists in reference to some class of objects but 
realists in reference to a different class. But on this level it is a trivial view which has a 
little cognitive value.
In conclusion we can say that Fleck’s theory and other similar standpoints undoubted-
ly show some important aspects of our knowledge — as, for example, an active role of a 
subject of cognition and its relation with social or cultural conditions — but in consequent 
and radical versions these theories are hard to defend and demand very sophisticated phi-
losophical argumentation. 
Amsterdamski’s conception is free from these diffi culties but there are other reasons 
why it can be considered inadequate. As a kind of compromise between realism and anti-re-
alistic constructivism, absolutism and relativism, it has too general form and it causes some 
trivial conclusions. Amsterdamski is trying to fi nd certain invariants of human scientifi c 
cognition which would let him save such things as truth (as a correspondence), objectivity 
and rationality of scientifi c ideas. But the fault of his project is that these invariants have too 
general and too enigmatic character and can embrace very different kinds of human activi-
ty, not only cognitive. Amsterdamski’s ideal of science was supposed to include many dif-
ferent scientifi c paradigms but in consequence it became so broad that it could include eve-
ry refl ective human activity. It seems that a more promising interpretation can be found in 
some propositions of Hilary Putnam, especially in his internal realism which is being deve-
loped in P olish philosophy of science by a mathematician and philosopher Adam Grobler3. 
The idea of cultural infl uence on scientifi c concepts, theories and scientifi c develop-
ment has been present in philosophy from the beginning although for most of the time it 
 
3 See for example Adam Grobler, Prawda a względność, Kraków 2002; idem, Metodologia nauk, 
Kraków 2006.
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has been on margins of the main philosophical currents. This situation was changed in the 
modern era. The question of role of culture in human cognition we can fi nd in the work of 
Francis Bacon (in his «theory of idols») and in critical philosophy of Kant. In my article 
I present two versions of the idea of cultural determinants of scientifi c knowledge formu-
lated in Polish philosophy of science. The fi rst was created by Ludwik Fleck — medical 
doctor and a biologist who published his famous book The Genesis and Development of 
a Scientifi c Fact in 1935. The second was proposed by a chemist and a philosopher Stefan 
Amsterdamski in his book Between History and Method published in 1983.
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ОБРАЗ СОВРЕМЕННОСТИ В РАБОТАХ 
РОССИЙСКИХ И ПОЛЬСКИХ ФИЛОСОФОВ
Существуют различные формы философского анализа общества, осуществляется попытка 
их соединения. Современный человек отказывается от стандартных форм жизни, это мень-
шая озабоченность доходами, и индивидуальной биографией, он выбирает не между това-
рами и злом, а между шуткой и драйвом. Даже для низших слоев населения на рынок вы-
шли стиль, мобильность, дизайн. На поверхности жизнь кипит не только в супермаркетах, 
но и в музеях, выставочных залах, увеселительных заведениях, полных людей. Однако это 
не значит, что общественность та, что была раньше. Перед нами толпа, где каждый в оди-
ночку бродит с собственной целью, не обращая внимания на окружающих. Современность 
должна найти способ сохранения и воспроизводства традиционных культурных механиз-
мов в новых условиях и на основе новых технологий. Главный урок XX века — преодоление 
свойственного противоборствующим сторонам и идеологиям предположения о неизбеж-
ности кризисов, чрезвычайных ситуаций и революций. Это нужно, чтобы не судить про-
шлое и осознать, что современность позволяет жить лучше и действовать более гуманно.
История человечества может быть рассмотрена под углом поисков способов 
объединения все растущего количества людей. Где же сегодня можно узреть обще-
ственное пространство? Парадокс в том, что все говорят о социальном прогрессе, 
а социальное пространство деградирует. Люди уже не ищут единства ни с космо-
сом, ни с обществом, не ориентируются на идею народа, государства или класса. На 
поверхности жизнь кипит, люди едут в транспорте, тесно прижатые друг к другу. 
Не только супермаркеты, но и музеи, выставочные залы, увеселительные заведения 
полны людей. Однако это не та публика, что была раньше. Перед нами толпа, где 
каждый одиноко бродит с собственной целью, не обращая внимания на других. От-
сюда проблемы современных политиков, которые пытаются создать коллективы из 
предателей коллектива.
В античности, единство греческого полиса достигалось на основе речей, произ-
носимых на агоре — рыночной площади. В Риме к этому добавились зрелища, объ-
единяющие большие массы людей как зрителей кровавых боев гладиаторов. Хрис-
тианство предложило миру новый союз членов божественной коммуны, сплоченной 
опытом греха, любви и прощения. Эпоха Просвещения положила начало книжному, 
